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Abstract 
 The conduct of the 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria recorded 
mixed outcomes. Although fears that Election Day would be marred by 
serious violence were allayed to a large extent, some instances of technical 
hitches, vote buying and other forms of electoral manipulations were 
recorded in some parts. However, these electoral hitches were not sufficient 
to alter the expected outcome of the election. For the first time in Nigeria’s 
political history, an incumbent president lost power in a general election. Has 
Nigeria’s democracy consolidated satisfactorily? The burden of this paper is 
to examine the trajectories of the 2015 presidential election relying on both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of research. The paper concludes that 
much has to be done if Nigeria’s democracy is to scale the second turn-over 
test Huntington establishes as the bench mark which if a new democracy 
survives two turnovers of power, then it has consolidated satisfactorily. 
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Introduction 
 Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election was unique in many ways. First, 
it marked an unprecedented uninterrupted 5th presidential election since 
return to democracy in 1999. The first Republic lasted only 6 years from 
1960 to 1966, the second Republic lasted only 4 years from 1979 to 1984, 
while the third Republic was truncated after 4 years of expensive transition 
programmes between 1989 and 1993.  
 Second, it was unique because for the first time, an incumbent 
president lost an election. Even though many incumbent governors have lost 
elections at the state level, the “power of incumbency” has always been 
potent at the federal level. 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 edition vol.11, No.19  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
170 
 Third, this marked the first time the loser in a presidential election 
will call to congratulate the winner even before the official results were 
finalised. 
 Fourth, it is also the first time there will be no post-election violence 
despite predictions by different observers and commentators including the 
US.  
 Fifth, it is also the first time an electronic device called the Card 
reader and a chip card called the Permanent Voter’s Card (PVC) were 
introduced by the electoral body (INEC). 
 Has Nigeria come of age politically? Are all these a fluke due only to 
the overwhelming desire for change or a true test of democratic 
consolidation? 
 In dealing with the research questions raised above, this paper is 
organised under the following subtopics;  
1. What is Democratic Consolidation 
2. Elections in Nigeria 
3. Run-up to the 2015 presidential election 
4. Conduct of election 
5. Why PDP Jonathan lost 
6. Recommendation/Conclusion 
 
Democratic Consolidation 
 The concept of democratic consolidation evolves out of concern 
about whether the former authoritarian regimes will be able to sustain their 
newly found democracy. The idea is that the task of sustaining democracy is 
as difficult as the task of establishing it. This has brought the concept of 
democratic consolidation to the centre of academic discourse.  
 Democratic consolidation is the process by which a new democracy 
matures, in a way that means it is unlikely to revert to authoritarianism 
without an external shock. (Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia). 
 Diamond (1999) describes democratic consolidation as the process of 
achieving broad and deep legitimation such that all significant political 
actors believe that popular rule is better for their society than any other 
alternative they can imagine. (Diamond L. (1999). Hence, it is a state of 
developed democratic cultures where political actors adhere to the 
democratic rules of the game.  
 Democratic Consolidation has also been defined as series of 
continuous actions and changes geared towards the replacement of an 
existing system of authoritarian and undemocratic rule. (Yagboyaju, (2007). 
 According to Asiwaju (2000), democratic consolidation implies the 
internalisation of democratic culture and the institutionalisation of 
democratic best process.  
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 Put another way, consolidation suggests there is a democratic 
foundation being strengthened and built upon. Tinubu, (2009). 
 Nwokeke Osinakachukwu and Jayum A. Jawan (2011) wrote that 
democratic consolidation “implies a democracy that can last for the test of 
time…This is a democracy that will come and stay and which cannot come 
to an end suddenly or abruptly through unconstitutional acts such as military 
coups or dictatorships”, (p.130).  
 In my opinion, democratic consolidation is a journey and not a 
destination. It is a process not an event. It implies that the people of a 
particular country are imbibing and displaying a democratic culture that 
propels democracy and makes democracy continuously irreversible. 
 Hence, a research into democratic consolidation in Nigeria should 
look at those input and output mechanisms that make democracy thrive. 
 Some scholars have argued that that the process by which a 
democracy becomes consolidated involves the creation and improvement of 
secondary institutions of the democracy. Linz & Stepan (1996).  
 On the other hand, some other scholars like O'Donnell (1996)' have 
argued that the institutionalization of electoral rules is not the most crucial 
feature of democratic consolidation. Rather the informal practices of actors 
are very vital in democratic consolidation. Consolidation therefore occurs 
when the actors in a system follow the formal rules of the democratic 
institution. 
 Contradicting this position are Gasiorowski and Power (1998). They 
asserted that the process-centric literature on democratic consolidation has 
paid inadequate attention to the effects of structural factors. Focusing on the 
Third World countries, they used three indicators of consolidation and 
multivariate statistical techniques. The authors' main finding is that 
development-related socioeconomic factors, the contagion effect of 
democratic neighbours, and high inflation each strongly affect the likelihood 
of consolidation, although the latter was significant only in the early part of 
the period studied. Several other factors have no apparent effect, including 
several measures dealing with political culture and the design of democratic 
institutions. These three factors together strongly predict which Third World 
democracies achieve consolidation. 
 In another vein, Regilme Jr. (2013) has controversially suggested that 
the cause of non-democratic consolidation in developing countries is brain 
drain in which high skilled workers from developing countries migrate to 
high-income and capital-rich countries. This leaves many new democracies 
in the developing world problems in terms of steering effective governance 
due to the lack of high-skilled professionals. 
 Focusing on Nigeria, some have argued that it is too early to talk of 
democratic consolidation in Nigeria. “With over 10,000 dead in communal 
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conflicts and an exponential increase in societal violence, many will argue 
that it is too early to talk of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Indeed, the 
fact that the public still casts doubt on the state’s capacity to manage 
domestic crises and to protect the security of life and property underscores 
primarily the depth of disenchantment with the state of things. As Nigeria 
drifts down the path of increasing violent conflict, perhaps we should first 
move away from current disappointment and ask if anything could really 
have been different from the current situation, given the provenance of 
civilian rule”. Fayemi (2012). Fayemi argued further that it is difficult to 
“have democracy without democrats” because of the dominance of the 
political party hierarchy by retired military officers and civilians closely 
connected to the military elite who set the tone for a party formation that 
pays little attention to ideology.  
 Tinubu’s (2009) Verdict on Nigeria’s democracy is that there is as 
yet “no true democracy” in Nigeria. 
 He argued that the period between 1999 and 2009 was at best, 10 
years of civil rule, even if all the structures of a democratic setting, the 
Presidency, the National Assembly and the Judiciary (at the federal level); 
and the Governorship, the State Legislatures and the Judiciary (at the state 
levels) were all in operation, “those democratic structures are built on the 
quicksand of a general anti-democratic mindset: faulty elections, dubious 
mandates and abuse of security forces, by the ruling party, to rig elections”, 
etc. Analysing Obasanjo’s presidency, Tinubu, himself a state governor 
between 1999 and 2007 argued that Nigeria’s was a democratic dispensation 
run on military temper”.  
  “…..the conduct of Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo as elected president, 
left little or no doubt that there was a sort of “Army Arrangement”…..His 
style was gruff and dismissive. He barely disguised his contempt for 
democratic finesse. He openly and unrepentantly subverted due process. He, 
without end, blackmailed the National Assembly on some bogus pretence to 
higher ideals of patriotism”.  
 Durotoye’s (2014) verdict having reviewed Nigeria’s democracy was 
a little more balanced. “It was clear however that democracy in Nigeria 
could not be described as ‘real democracy’ during the period (1999-2007). 
…in view of the different kinds of anti-democratic practices by the political 
class. Election rigging and brigandage, violence and election annulment were 
common practices. The trend is towards a reversal to the old order of 
despotic political rulership under the guise of civil governance. One cannot 
but agree that elections in Nigeria in the period under study were a fading 
shadow of democracy, endangering the fragile democratic project itself. The 
use of state power and security privilege to harass and intimidate the 
challenger's machinery was widespread. Harassment of the opposition was 
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the most intransigent legacy that has survived from the locust years of 
military autocracy, and those who are deeply concerned about the survival of 
democracy might be tempted to believe that this legacy could abort the 
survival of democratic values in the nation”. However, he added 
“considering the fact that the role of the legislature and the judiciary during 
the period showed that all hope is not yet lost in the match towards 
democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Unlike most African countries, Nigerian 
democracy had been strengthened by strong political institutions necessary to 
solidify democratic practices. Democratic contest is alive even though 
battered”.  
 
Elections in Nigeria 
 Free and fair election is the benchmark of democracy. In other words, 
democracy implies that the people have the opportunity to decide who 
governs them. Regular elections offer the people the opportunity to accept or 
refuse the men who are to govern them. It is free and fair elections that 
confirm the legitimacy of a government as well as withdraw legitimacy from 
one government and gives it to the other. It is the political right enjoyed by 
the people to decide who should govern them in a free and fair election that 
separates democracy from any other kind of political system. Election has 
also been described as the post mortem that investigates the record of office 
holders to ascertain whether they have kept faith with their election promises 
or not. (Dickeson, 1990).  
 Foremost writer on democracy, Schumpeter (1947) stated that 
democracy ensures that the people have the opportunity of accepting or 
refusing the men who are to rule them. Hence democracy is all about 
elections and choosing political leaders. 
 A review of elections in Nigeria since independence reveals that 
election rigging has been a constant factor in Nigeria’s democratic process.  
 Osinachukwu and Jawan (2011) examined election rigging and its 
effect on democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Relying on qualitative 
approach using data gathered from secondary sources as well as historical 
analysis by looking into the histories of election rigging in Nigeria from 
1960 to 2007, they concluded that election rigging has hindered the 
emergence of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Thereby, elections in 
Nigeria have not been able to bring about leadership change that will enforce 
accountability in leadership.  “Election riggings in Nigeria were evident in 
1964/1965, 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, 2003 and 2007 general elections.” 
(p.128). 
 Electoral frauds include illegal printing of voters’ cards, illegal 
possession of ballot boxes, stuffing of ballot boxes, falsification of election 
results, illegal thumb-printing of ballot papers, infant voting, compilation of 
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fictitious names on voters’ lists, illegal compilation of separate voters’ lists, 
illegal printing of forms used for collection and declaration of election 
results, deliberate refusal to supply election materials to certain areas, 
announcing results in places where no elections were held, switching and 
unauthorized announcement of results, harassment of candidates, agents and 
voters, change of list of electoral officials, as well as box- inflation of 
figures, among others. (P.131). 
4. Catalogue of Election Rigging Methods in Nigeria As Enumerated by National 
Conscience Party 
1. Recognition of non-existing polling units by INEC and allocation of voting materials 
to same. 
2. Bribing of INEC officials, the police and security agents with irresistible amounts to 
perpetrate election rigging. 
2. Use by INEC of partisan party supporters as electoral officers to man Polling Stations. 
3. Diversion of electoral materials to private offices, residence and palaces of traditional 
rulers for manipulation and falsification. 
4. Concealment or non-release of voters’ register loaded with false names later used as a 
ghost. 
5. Voters register used at polling units not numbered, thus permitting arbitrary addition 
of names to the register. 
6. Unannounced and sudden change of location of polling stations and collation centers. 
7. Pre-stuffing of ballot boxes with fake ballot papers before the day of the election. 
8. Stuffing of illegal ballot boxes with illegal papers. 
9. Sale of pre-stuffed ballot boxes to candidates. 
10. Replacement or exchange of official ballot boxes with unofficial ballot boxes 
containing unofficial thumb-printed ballot papers (throwing ballot boxes into the 
water in riverine areas and replacing with freshly stuffed ballot boxes from illegal 
quarters). 
11. Addition of unofficial ballot boxes to official ballot boxes containing already thumb 
printed 
ballot papers. 
12. Falsification of results and forgery of figure both at polling units and collation centers. 
13. Multiple voting to which INEC officials and the police are indifferent. 
14. Use of under-aged children as voters to which INEC officials and the police are 
indifferent. 
15. Use of special ethylated spirit to clean off the so-called indelible ink of fingernails to 
facilitate multiple voting. 
16. Use of Vaseline on the fingernails before the so-called indelible ink is applied by 
polling officers in order to enable easy cleansing and facilitate multiple voting. 
17. Thumb printing of ballot papers by INEC officials. 
18. Thumb printing of ballot papers by security agents. 
19. Thumb printing of ballot papers by some domestic monitors. 
20. Accumulation and use of illegally acquired voting cards to vote on election days. 
21. Use of party agents as surveyors of voters’ cards to facilitate impersonation and 
multiple voting. 
22. Dressing up party agents in police uniforms to intimidate opponents at polling and 
collation centers. 
23. Use of armed thugs to harass and intimidate opponents and rival 
party agents. 
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24. Use of police and security operatives to terrorize opponents and rival party agents. 
25. Use of armed thugs, police and security operatives to intimidate party agents of rival 
parties to depart from polling center. 
26. Party members of the ruling parties bearing INEC tags on polling days to facilitate 
moving from polling station to polling station and from one collation center to another 
with a view to rigging elections. 
27. Printing and use of fake election results sheets with same numbers as authentic result 
sheets. 
28. Forcing some party agents at gunpoint to sign forged election results. 
29. Canvassing for votes at polling centers with impunity. 
30. Members of the ruling parties claiming falsely to be party agents for rival political 
parties so as to give cover to the rigging of election results. 
31. Intimidating and compelling voters, in some instances at gunpoint to vote for 
particular parties 
32. Ruling parties compromising agents of newly registered parties by offering them 
bribe. 
33. Exposure of voters to the full glare of party agents in the process of voting which 
denied voters of privacy and negated the legal requirement of secret balloting. 
34. Posting of false results by INEC on its website for internet consumption that had 
borne with results emanating from polling centers. 
35. Change of candidates for election few days before election and in some cases after 
election. 
36. Sale of mandate to the highest bidder. 
37. Use of different fingers to make imprints on ballot papers in order to prevent easy 
discovery of multiple voting. 
38. Agents of ruling parties forcefully seizing ballot papers from 
voters known to have voted against the favoured party and deliberate invalidation of 
same by making additional finger imprints. 
39. Use of looted public money to bribe voters. 
40. Distribution of foodstuffs and soup ingredients such as rice, garri, beans, maize, 
groundnut oil, maggi and other items like sugar, slippers, roofing sheets, clothing 
materials, etc. to induce voters. 
41. Refusing to count and discarding of ballot papers identified as thumb printed for 
political parties that are not favoured,  
Source: Muhammad Aminu Kwasau, The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, European Scientific Journal, VOL. 9, NO.8, 2013 
 
 From the above table, it can be deduced that election rigging has been 
a threat to democracy in Nigeria. Unfortunately, politicians who carried out 
this dastardly act have gone scot free. “In as much as politicians are not 
nailed in their previous manipulation of elections, the future politicians keep 
re-strategizing manipulations for subsequent elections, thereby making 
election rigging inevitable in Nigerian politics”. Osinakachukwu & Jawan 
(2011:136).  
 Apart from the political class, electoral manipulations in Nigeria were 
aided and abetted by biased electoral umpires.   
 “Since the return to civil rule on 29 May 1999, Nigeria has held three 
general elections, aside from sundry re-run elections and local government 
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polls. Of the three general elections, none of them met the muster of sane 
polling, even if to be fair, the 1999 election, under the direction of the late 
Ephraim Akpata, appeared the cleanest of the three. But a disturbing trend is 
that as each general election was worse than the preceding one (2003 was 
worse than 1999; and 2007 was worse than 2003), each succeeding electoral 
umpire was also worse than his predecessor”. (Tinubu 2009). 
 Ranking the different electoral chiefs, Tinubu added “Chief Akpata 
did a fair job. But that cannot be said of Dr. Abel Guobadia who succeeded 
him. Of course, Prof. Maurice Iwu, the current (as of 2009) Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC) chairman appears to have broken all 
bounds in how not to conduct elections; the latest example being the Ekiti 
governorship re-run and the drama and controversy that surrounded the final 
“result”. Prof. Iwu, with his perfidy, is surely leading Nigeria into the abyss 
and our democracy into a dungeon. If immediate action is not taken, Iwu will 
lead our electoral system into a state where candidates will prepare for war 
instead of electioneering. That would result in a situation of mutually assured 
destruction. But even with his extremely bad record, he is unfazed. He 
supervises the conception, monitoring and execution of mandate robbery – 
and he does so with reckless abandon! No thanks to Iwu, INEC has 
BECOME a nest of election riggers. Despite all that, he goes on an ego trip, 
when reacting to his troubled conscience, claiming that he has a lot to teach 
both Ghana and the United States in the ABC of clean elections. Yet by 
universal consensus, he conducted the worst election in Nigerian history in 
2007. Since then, he has continued his electoral rascality with phoney re-runs 
in which he and his collaborators, not the Nigerian electorate, decide who 
win or lose elections!” 
 What one can glean from the above is that Nigeria has fared very 
badly at each passing election and electoral manipulation is the greatest 
single threat to Nigeria’s democratic survival.  
 Apart from electoral fraud perpetrated by politicians and aided by the 
electoral umpires in some cases, there are many other challenges facing 
democratic consolidation in Nigeria which include the balkanization of the 
society along tribal and religious sentiments, the absence of true federalism, 
abject poverty, disjointed and manipulated (mis) information by the media, 
corruption, the politics of godfatherism and insecurity among many other 
factors. Kwasau (2013)  
 The perennial problem of lack of credible and democratic electoral 
process has been linked with the phenomenon of “failed, uncaring and 
unresponsive governance” in Nigeria. Inokoba and Kumokor (2011:139). No 
wonder, years of civil rule since 1999 has failed to deliver on good roads, 
functioning health amenities, quality education, uninterrupted power supply, 
living wages for workers, effective petroleum sector, genuine electoral 
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reform, equitable distribution of wealth and so on. Hence, Nigeria’s 
democracy has been described as merely formalistic and devoid of 
substance. (Ibid. p.139). 
 If credible elections are the barometer for measuring democratic 
consolidation, then we can say that Nigeria is maturing democratically if 
only the 2015 elections can be adjudged to be freer and fairer than previous 
elections. To this task we now turn. 
  
Run Up to the 2015 Presidential Elections 
a. Emergence of APC 
 The All Progressive Congress (APC) was formed in February 2013 as 
an offshoot of a merger of Nigeria's three biggest opposition parties – the 
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change 
(CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) – and a faction of the All 
Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA). For the first time since 1999, a 
formidable opposition was formed to take on the PDP in the general 
elections. The new coalition was approved by the nation's electoral umpire 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on 31 July 2013 to 
become a political party. Branding itself as a social welfarist party, APC was 
admitted as a consultative member into the Socialist International on 12–13 
December 2014. The Socialist International (SI) is a worldwide association 
of political parties most of which seek to establish democratic socialism. It 
consists mostly of democratic socialist, social-
democratic and labour political parties and other organisations. Formed in 
1951 it has grown to include more than 160 member parties from more than 
100 countries 
b. Emergence of Buhari as APC’s Candidate 
 On 10 December, 2014, former military ruler and three-time 
presidential candidate, Major General Muhammadu Buhari, emerged the 
presidential candidate of the party having  scored 57.2 percent of the 5,992 
votes cast to defeat Kano State Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso, former Vice 
President Atiku Abubakar, Imo State Governor Rochas Okorocha and 
newspaper owner Sam Nda Isaiah. On 17 December, 2014, APC chose a 
lawyer and academic, Professor Yemi Osinbajo as the running mate of 
General Buhari. APC's voter base is in the North and the South West. 
c. Rumpus in PDP and Mass Defection to APC 
 In November 2013, five serving Governors from the governing PDP 
defected to the APC, a fallout of the Governors Forum’s (An informal 
Organisation of the 36 States’ governors) election in which the candidate of 
the president and governor of Plateau state, Jona Jang,  was recognised as the 
winner of the chairmanship election by the presidency even though he scored 
fewer votes than Governor Rotimi Amaechi, the incumbent chairman and 
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governor of the oil-rich Rivers state. The fallout of the governors’ forum 
imbroglio was that 5 PDP governors decamped to the APC. The governors 
who defected to the APC were Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers State, Abdulfatah 
Ahmed of Kwara State, Rabiu Kwankwaso of Kano State, Murtala Nyako of 
Adamawa State and Aliyu Wamakko of Sokoto State. 49 PDP federal 
legislators also decamped to APC. This initially gave the APC a slim 
majority of 186 legislators in the Lower House out of a total of 360 
legislators. After months of intrigues and political bickering, National 
Chairman of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Alhaji Bamanga Tukur also 
resigned his position in January 2014. Bamanga Tukur was not very popular 
with majority of the PDP governors. 
 Just before Tukur’s resignation, PDP’s former general secretary, 
himself a former state governor and military general defected to APC on 
account of the failure of the party to reinstate himself despite a court order to 
the effect. Oyinlola described the APC as the only formidable party in the 
country, saying that his decision to join the party was as a result of the 
ideology of the party and the performances of its governors. 
 Probably the most devastating blow to the ruling PDP was the 
resignation of former President Olusegun Obasanjo tearing his party card 
describing the PDP as a “useless party” while launching a public attack on 
President Goodluck Jonathan whom he had helped install as president. He 
was reported to have said “I have reason to believe that most or should I say 
all of you are wondering why I have chosen to defect to the APC and I must 
say that if I had been told that I would have to switch party some 5 years ago, 
I myself would have argued it. I believe in transparency and integrity but 
unfortunately, PDP is an opposite of such attributes”. (See OBJ Defects To 
APC And Calls Jonathan Administration, “Useless Government”. Retrieved 
on 15 April 2015 from http://news.nigeriannation.com/lo-ba-tan-obasanjo-
defects-to-apc-photos-of-defection-party-photo-news/s). 
 President Jonathan’s emergence as the PDP’s presidential candidate 
on 10 December 2014, further led to the defection of some PDP members in 
the House of Representatives to APC. 
d. INEC Insists on the use of PVC and Electronic Card Readers for the 
Elections 
• Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) 
 The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) produced 
Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) for the 68,833,476 persons in the biometric 
Register of Voters ahead of the March 28th and April 11th, 2015 general 
elections. The PVC replaces the Temporary Voter Card (TVC) issued on the 
heels of registration of voters since 2011.  
 These cards have many components and specialized features (e.g. 
base substrate, security printing, personalization, lamination and chip 
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embedding), and it is designed with an average life span of ten (10) years. 
The PVC also has an embedded chip that contains all the biometrics of a 
legitimate holder (including fingerprints and facial image). On Election Day, 
it would be swiped with a Smart Card Reader at the polling unit to ensure 
100 per cent authentication and verification of the voter before he/she is 
allowed to vote. The PVC has security features that are not easily susceptible 
to counterfeiting. 
 Despite PDP and the Presidency’s opposition to its use for the 2015 
elections, INEC insisted that only voters who have their PVC will be allowed 
to vote in the 2015 general elections. INEC extended the collection of the 
PVCs beyond the initial 8 March 2015 deadline by two weeks to ensure that 
all eligible and registered voters collected their PVCs.  
 The elections were postponed by 6 weeks to enable all eligible voters 
collect their PVCs and allow the security forces sufficiently push back the 
Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria’s North East. 
• Card Readers  
 Equally, INEC insisted that for the first time in Nigeria’s electoral 
history, electronic voter authentication system (Smart Card Readers) will be 
deployed for the 2015 general elections. The card reader uses a highly secure 
and cryptographic technology that is used commonly in devices that need to 
perform secure transactions, such as paying terminals.  It has ultra-low 
power consumption, with a single core frequency of 1.2GHz and an Android 
4.2.2 operating system. According to INEC, the card reader units have been 
broadly subjected to Quality Assurance, Integrity and Functionality testing 
and found reliable in ease of use, battery life and speed of processing. For 
instance, it takes an average of 10 seconds to authenticate a voter. The 
electoral umpire further announced that the card readers would also be 
subjected to Stress testing in the states and FCT ahead of the March 28 and 
April 11, 2015 elections. INEC promised to make a card reader available at 
every voting point in the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) 
during the 2015 elections, with a substantial number of spares available to 
address contingencies.  
 
Election Conduct and Results 
 Fourteen candidates contested the election but it was a straight battle 
between the PDP’s President Goodluck Jonathan and APC’s Muhammadu 
Buhari. The breakdown of the result as shown in the table below shows that 
the APC won 53.96% of the votes as opposed to the PDP’s 44.96%. APC 
won convincingly in 4 of the 6 geo-political zones namely the North West 
where its presidential candidate hails from, North East riddled with Boko 
Haram insurgency, North Central and the South West where the APC’s Vice 
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presidential candidate hails from while the PDP cleared the votes in the 
South-south-home base of president Jonathan and the South East. 
• 2015 President Election Results 
     Buhari   53.96% 
Jonathan   44.96% 
Margin: 2,571,759 
Candidate Party Votes % 
 Muhammadu Buhari All Progressives Congress 15,424,921 53.96 
 Goodluck Jonathan People's Democratic Party 12,853,162 44.96 
 Adebayo Ayeni African Peoples Alliance 53,537 0.19 
 Ganiyu Galadima Allied Congress Party of Nigeria 40,311 0.14 
 Sam Eke Citizens Popular Party 36,300 0.13 
 Rufus Salau Alliance for Democracy 30,673 0.11 
 Mani Ahmad African Democratic Congress 29,665 0.10 
 Allagoa Chinedu Peoples Party of Nigeria 24,475 0.09 
 Martin Onovo National Conscience Party 24,455 0.09 
 Tunde Anifowose-Kelani Accord Alliance 22,125 0.08 
 Chekwas Okorie United Progressive Party 18,220 0.06 
 Comfort Sonaiya KOWA Party 13,076 0.05 
 Godson Okoye United Democratic Party 9,208 0.03 
 Ambrose Albert Owuru Hope Party 7,435 0.03 
Invalid/blank votes 844,519 – 
Total 29,432,083 100 
Registered voters/turnout 67,422,005 43.65 
Source: INEC 
 
Muhammadu Buhari was declared the winner of the presidential election having scored the majority of 
the votes and one quarter of the votes in two-thirds of the state as stipulated by the 1999 constitution. 
Even though the election was believed to be generally free and fair, there were a few irregularities listed 
below; 
• Several polling units across the country opened later than scheduled occasioned by the late 
arrival of election officials and materials 
• The polling environment was reasonably secured with minimal disruption as members of the 
Police Force and other security agencies established a noticeable presence within the polling 
environment with most operating unarmed 
• Card readers failed to function properly in some areas including the President’s polling unit 
and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) directed election officers to 
manually accredit voters using the voter register in those places. 
• Electoral irregularities were witnessed in some polling units in Kano and Sokoto states where 
party supporters were unduly assisting election officials in the polling process 
• Voting cubicles were not seen in several polling units in Kano, Kaduna and Osun States 
which means voters were unable to cast their votes in secret. 
• Bomb explosives were detonated in Enugu and there were explosions in Akwa, Anambra 
states. 
• There was hijacking of a vehicle conveying election officials and materials in Ebonyi state 
• Assault on some members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) who were ad-hoc 
staff of INEC in Ijiam-Ekpomata ward, Ikwo LGA of the state. 
• In Rivers state, there were reports of sporadic shootings in Ozuaha community in Ikwerre 
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LGA by thugs who barricaded the road into the town and in the process opened fire on a team 
of policemen and military police escorting NYSC members to polling units. 
(See CDD REPORT: Matters arising from Voting Phase of Nigeria 2015 Presidential, National 
Assembly Elections at https://nigeriaelections.org/newsfeed/37 retrieved on 28 April 2015). 
Many observers commended the conduct of the elections for being peaceful, free and fair. It was also 
believed that the election represents a victory for democracy and the right of the people of Nigeria to 
determine who rules them. The security apparatuses were also believed to have ensured the peaceful and 
orderly conduct of the elections. (Soniyi, 2015). 
 
Why Jonathan/PDP Lost 
 Many reasons could be adduced for the defeat of PDP in the 
presidential election. Some of the reasons have been highlighted above. In 
addition, this paper will rely on an online survey by 
Globalreportersnews.com. The survey question posed was “What could be 
the major reason Jonathan lost to Buhari?” 
The result posted on April 6, 2015 is recalled below: 
Factor Percentage 
Corruption 29% 
Manipulation/betrayal by party members 26% 
Poor Performance 21% 
Ethnic/minority background 11% 
Boko Haram/Chibok girls 9% 
Religion 3% 
Globalreportersnews.com. Accessed April 6, 2015. 
 
 The online poll may have its limitations. Only 903 people 
participated in the poll which looks an insignificant number. Besides, their 
demography, location, ethnic and religious backgrounds were not stated. 
Hence likely prejudices could not be ascertained. However, the website 
guarded against multiple voting as no one could vote twice on a computer 
unit. Despite the limitations, the survey result appears a true reflection of the 
mood of the majority of Nigerians before the presidential elections. The 
Jonathan government was riddled with serious allegations of corruption. A 
former Central Bank governor, Lamido Sanusi alleged that about $40 billion 
of oil revenue was unaccounted by the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC). In 2013, Nigeria ranked 144th of 177 in the 
“Corruption by Country” rating of Transparency International. As stated 
earlier, PDP was in turmoil before the elections and it is very likely that 
some members may have worked against the interest of the party at the polls. 
The Jonathan presidency was also believed to have performed woefully in 
the different sectors of the economy like the power, road, aviation and many 
other sectors.  Even though Nigeria was rated the largest economy in Africa 
during the Jonathan presidency, not many Nigerians could feel the impact. 
Youth unemployment was put at over 50% (Durotoye, 2014b). Surprisingly, 
it appeared the Boko Haram insurgency and the kidnap of over 200 school 
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girls in Chibok, Borno state did not play a major role. This may be due to the 
fact that the government had sufficiently rooted out the insurgents a few 
weeks before the elections. Another explanation might be that not many 
people in the North East where Boko Haram holds sway partook in the polls.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 The conduct of the 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria recorded 
mixed outcomes. While fears in some quarters that Election Day would be 
marred by serious violence were allayed to a large extent, some instances of 
technical hitches, non-compliance with electoral regulations, vote buying and 
other forms of electoral manipulations were recorded in some states of the 
Federation. 
 However, it did not appear that these electoral hitches were sufficient 
to alter the expected outcome of the election. The electorates were patient 
and determined to cast their votes. The clamour for change was the driving 
force for many of them. 
 Nigeria’s democracy has scaled the huddle of one turn-over test of 
political change. It remains to be seen whether or not it will fulfil the second 
turn-over test enunciated by Huntington. Samuel Huntington establishes the 
bench mark of the ‘two turnover test’ in which if a new democracy survives 
two turnovers of power, then it has consolidated satisfactorily (Huntington 
1993:267). 
 The following recommendations are put forward by this paper; 
• Appointment of INEC chairman: As suggested by a panel headed by 
a former Chief Justice of Nigeria, the Uwais panel, the position of INEC 
chairman must be advertised and the short-listing of three after adequate 
screening by the National Judicial Council (NJC). NJC then passes the short 
list to the president who picks one and sends his name to the Senate for 
confirmation. This will deny any sitting president the chance to plant a party 
sympathiser as electoral chief. 
• Time-limit in electoral adjudication: Every electoral petition should 
be dispensed with before the swearing-in. The current practice enables 
someone alleged to have stolen the vote enjoys the plums of office and even 
spends government money on his petition defence before eventually losing at 
the court.  
• Electoral Offences Commission: This is to strengthen the state's 
capacity to punish electoral criminals. Such a commission should be made to 
dispense justice faster than the conventional courts, without necessarily 
sacrificing the principles of justice and fair play. Any elected office holder 
found guilty must not only be barred from future elections, he must go to jail 
for the offence. So too must colluding electoral and security officials. 
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• Independent candidature: This will enrich our democratic process and 
curb cases of imposition in the parties and lack of internal democracy, 
knowing that an alternative platform is open to aggrieved but popular 
candidates. 
• The present introduction of the Permanent Voter Card (PVC) is a step 
in the right direction. The PVC captures the biometrics of the voters on the 
roll. The use of Electronic Card Reader must be perfected to avoid technical 
hitches as experienced during the last elections. 
• Ballot Scanning machine should be introduced to scan used ballot 
papers and record votes in real time. 
• There must be compulsory Presidential Debate to enhance quality of 
choice. Political campaigns in the last elections were bereft of ideas and 
more of character assassination and mundane issues. 
• There must be intense war against Poverty to discourage vote selling. 
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